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RESUMEN El artículo constituye una propuesta encaminada a dar respuesta a la necesidad social de la superación del profesor de Educación Física del Centro de Experiencia del Adulto Mayor. Se propone como objetivo fundamentar la estrategia para la superación del profesor de Educación Física dirigida a la rehabilitación acuática de los adultos mayores con limitaciones articulares, desde una visión de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad. Se reconoce la oportunidad que representa el empleo de las nuevas tecnologías como elemento que contribuye a (...) la mejora de la calidad de vida de las personas mayores. La magnitud del reto exige la puesta en acción de todos los resortes con los que la sociedad cuenta, para la atención al envejecimiento, mediante diversos programas, cuya significación contribuye a fortalecer la identidad nacional, y a elevar la cultura general integral de los profesores hacia los adultos mayores lo cual repercutirá en la formación de una conciencia social, política y cultural. ABSTRACT The article constitutes a proposal directed to give answer to the social need for the self-improvement of the teacher of Physical Education of the Center of Experience of the Elder Adult. It proposes as objective: to base the strategy for the self-improvement of the teacher of Physical Education directed to the aquatic rehabilitation of the elderly with articular limitations, from a vision of science, technology and society. It is recognized the opportunity that represents the employment of the new technologies as element that contributes to the progress of the quality of life of the elderly. The magnitude of the challenge demands the putting in action of all the springs with which the society is provided, for the attention to the aging, by means of diverse programs, which significance helps to strengthen the national identity, and to raise the integral general culture of the teachers towards the elderly which will reverberate in the formation of a social, political and cultural conscience. (shrink)

Throughout the Western world people turn towards the health care system seeking help for a variety of psychosomatic/psychosocial health problems. They become “patients” and find themselves within a system of practises that conceptualizes their bodies as “objective” bodies, treats their ill health in terms of the malfunctioning machine, and compartmentalizes their lived experiences into medically interpreted symptoms and signs of underlying biological dysfunction. The aim of this article is to present an alternative way of describing ill health and rehabilitation (...) using the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to deepen our understanding of the rehabilitation process. I will explore how the experience of chronic pain ruptures the natural connection between body and world and how the rehabilitation process can be understood as the re-insertion of the body into the flow of experience, where the body “disappears” into its natural silence in order to allow the world to once again unfold. The experience of chronic pain places the painful body in focus, resulting in a diminished articulation of both self and world. Persons with illness suffer not only from the physical aspects of pain and discomfort but also from a loss of identity where one feels alienated and detached from things that used to give meaning to ones life. Rehabilitation must not only address the material (medical) body but also the diminished sense of self as well as the retreat from the world outside of the painful body. (shrink)

In recent years, a renascent form of pragmatism has developed which argues that a satisfactory pragmatic position must integrate into itself the concepts of truth and objectivity. This New Pragmatism, as Cheryl Misak calls it, is directed primarily against Rorty's neo-pragmatic dismissal of these concepts. For Rorty, the goal of our epistemic practices should not be to achieve an objective view, one that tries to represent things as they are 'in themselves,' but rather to attain a view of things (...) that can gain as much inter-subjective agreement as possible. In Rorty's language, we need to replace the aim of objectivity with that of solidarity. While the New Pragmatists agree with Rorty's 'humanist' and .. (shrink)

Nagel’s challenge is to devise an objective phenomenological vocabulary that can describe the objective structural similarities between aural and visual perception. My contention is that Charles Sanders Peirce’s little studied and less understood phenomenological vocabulary makes a significant contribution to meeting this challenge. I employ Peirce’s phenomenology to identify the structural isomorphism between seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet’s blare. I begin by distinguishing between the vividness of an experience and the intensity of a quality. I proceed to (...) identify further points of structural isomorphism (a) between the experience of seeing a scarlet red and of hearing a trumpet blare and (b) between the qualities of those experiences. Lastly, I gesture towards how these distinctions can be an aid in describing what it is like to be a bat. (shrink)

Objects are inert, passive, devoid of will, and as such bear no intrinsic value or moral worth. This claim is supported by the argument that to be considered a moral agent one must have a conscious will and be sufficiently free to act in accordance with that will. Since material objects, it is assumed, have no active will nor freedom, they should not be considered moral agents nor bearers of intrinsic ethical vale. Thus, the apparent “moral neutrality” of objects rests (...) upon a kind of subject/object or mind/body dualism. The aim of this paper is to explore two paths by which western thought can escape this dualism, re-valuate the alleged “moral neutrality” of material objects, and initiate a sort of “object oriented ethics,” albeit with surprising results. To do so, this paper explores the work of Arthur Schopenhauer and Baruch Spinoza to interrogate both the claim that material objects have no will and that freedom is the necessary condition for ethical responsibility. This paper concludes by arguing that not only should objects been seen as bearers of their own ethical value, a determinate judgement can be made regarding that value through a basic understanding of the laws of physics. (shrink)

Inspired by the thinking of authors such as Andrew Feenberg, Tim Ingold and Richard Sennett, this article sets forth substantial criticism of the ‘social uprooting of technology’ paradigm, which deterministically considers modern technology an autonomous entity, independent and indifferent to the social world (practices, skills, experiences, cultures, etc.). In particular, the authors’ focus on demonstrating that the philosophy,methodology and experience linked to open source technological development represent an emblematic case of re-encapsulation of the technical code within social relations (reskilling practices). (...) Open source is discussed as a practice, albeit not unique, of community empowerment aimed at the participated and shared rehabilitation of technological production ex-ante. Furthermore, the article discusses the application of open source processes in the agro-biotechnological field, showing how they may support a more democratic endogenous development, capable of binding technological innovation to the objectives of social (reducing inequalities) and environmental sustainability to a greater degree. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up Graham Harman’s critique of the philosophy of access as well as his proposed non-anthropocentric ontology, and I ask what it would be like for human beings to live or practice such a proposal. Drawing on Harman’s thinking about prehension, but shifting focus towards work in critical phenomenology and feminist science studies, I argue for the importance of human prehensive self-awareness within non-anthropocentric ontological practices, an awareness that emerges phenomenologically and in practice. Extending both (...) Donna Haraway’s theory of companion species and phenomenological practices of being-here with other things, I lay a groundwork for practicing being human as companion object. (shrink)

Against those commentators who consider Kant’s explicit reference to Copernicus’s heliocentric reversal either grossly misleading or simply irrelevant to the revolution in philosophy carried out in the Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued in this paper that Kant’s transcendental idealist inversion of the familiar standpoint of realism and sound common sense fully justifies the talk of a ‘Copernican revolution,’ even if Kant himself never used the expression. It is not just the dominant ‘moving spectator’ motif (or transcendental turn) of (...) the Preface that has to do with Copernicus; both the immediately following ‘crucial experiment’ motif (on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves) and the ‘critical’ motif (regarding self-knowledge and the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments) confirm the aptness of the Copernican analogy. Still, some commentators have stretched the analogy too far; the final section of the paper attempts to determine just how far it may reasonably be said to go. (shrink)

Descartes entitled the Sixth Meditation "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body." But these topics take up only two paragraphs, about one-third of the way into the Sixth Meditation (which is the longest of the six). The other topics in the Meditation partly pertain to the cognitive faculties that a seeker after knowledge must employ: senses, imagination, and intellect. They also concern the mind–body relation: not only is it to be shown that mind and (...) body are distinct, but also that they are “closely joined” together. The joining of mind to body contributes to explanations of the cognitive faculties, for such a joining is, in Descartes’ view, necessary for the operation of sense and imagination, whereas the exercise of the intellect in the pursuit of metaphysical results -- as in his argument for mind–body distinctness -- takes place without the mind interacting with the body. But this still doesn't account for the most sustained discussion in the Sixth Meditation, which concerns the role of the senses in informing us about the world around us. While the trustworthiness of the senses has been under suspicion up to this point in the Meditations, now the senses are rehabilitated. They can serve to acquaint us with the world of bodies, for the purposes of empirical investigation serving natural philosophy but, more usually, for the practical purpose of informing us of potential benefits and harms in our immediate environment. In this regard, Descartes considers the ways in the senses might be subject to local errors or might, if used inappropriately, draw us into systematic error. But the previous results of the Meditations now offer the means for avoiding such systematic error, and the reflections of the Sixth Meditation can guide us toward practical uses of the senses in ways that reduce error. In the end, the senses are found to be trustworthy for the guidance of action, and this trustworthiness extends even to a qualitative experience such as color, which helps us to discriminate among the bodies that we see. (shrink)

Objective To examine medical students’ views on conscientious objection and controversial medical procedures.Methods Questionnaire study among Norwegian 5th and 6th year medical students.Results Five hundred and thirty-one of 893 students responded. Respondents object to a range of procedures not limited to abortion —notably euthanasia, ritual circumcision for boys, assisted reproduction for same-sex couples and ultrasound in the setting of prenatal diagnosis. A small minority would object to referrals for abortion. In the case of abortion, up to 55% would tolerate conscientious (...) refusals, whereas 42% would not. Higher proportions would tolerate refusals for euthanasia or ritual circumcision for boys.Discussion A majority of Norwegian medical students would object to participation in euthanasia or ritual circumcision for boys. However, in most settings, many medical students think doctors should not be able to refuse participation on grounds of conscience. A minority would accept conscientious refusals for procedures they themselves do not object to personally. Most students would not accept conscientious refusals for referrals.Conclusions Conscientious objection remains a live issue in the context of several medical procedures not limited to abortion. Although most would want a right to object to participation in euthanasia, tolerance towards conscientious objectors in general was moderate or low. (shrink)

This book explores how we can measure consciousness. It clarifies what consciousness is, how it can be generated from a physical system, and how it can be measured. It also shows how conscious states can be expressed mathematically and how precise predictions can be made using data from neurophysiological studies.

이 논문은 “객체를 향한 자유”로 요약되는 아도르노의 자유론을 미적 자유론으로 해석하면서 이 자유의 실천철학적 함의를 밝히고자 한다. 아도르노가 말하는 자유는 미적 참여이며, 미적 참여는 인간의 근원적 자발성으로서 미학적-인간학적 충동에 의해 가능하다. 이때 충동은 주체와 타자의 근원적 연관성 그리고 타자 의존성을 보여주는 개념이다. 이러한 해석으로부터 다음의 주장들이 귀결된다. 첫째, 미적 자유와 실천 사이에는 해소되지 않는 긴장 관계가 있다. 이는 미적 차원을 형성하는 힘인 충동의 통제 불가능성 때문이다. 둘째, 그런 긴장에도 불구하고 미적 자유의 차원은 실천에 구성적이다. 인간의 타자 의존성을 담지하는 이 차원이 (...) 없다면 실천은 오도된다. 끝으로, 아도르노의 미적 자유론은 궁극적으로 지배 비판이다. 실천에서 미적 차원의 불가결성은 근대의 이성 중심적 자유론이 함축하는 지배적-주권적 주체상에 대한 아도르노의 반박을 함축하기 때문이다. (shrink)

In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral (...) respect. In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons. (shrink)

Against those commentators who consider Kant’s explicit reference to Copernicus’s heliocentric reversal either grossly misleading or simply irrelevant to the revolution in philosophy carried out in the Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued in this paper that Kant’s transcendental idealist inversion of the familiar standpoint of realism and sound common sense fully justifies the talk of a ‘Copernican revolution,’ even if Kant himself never used the expression. It is not just the dominant ‘moving spectator’ motif (or transcendental turn) of (...) the Preface that has to do with Copernicus; both the immediately following ‘crucial experiment’ motif (on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves) and the ‘critical’ motif (regarding self-knowledge and the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments) confirm the aptness of the Copernican analogy. Still, some commentators have stretched the analogy too far; the final section of the paper attempts to determine just how far it may reasonably be said to go. (shrink)

(2013). Towards the Rehabilitation of the Will in Contemporary Philosophy. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 44, Life, Truth, Transcendence, pp. 286-301.

In Part II we primarily studied the key philosophical concept of objectivity through its applications in methodologically divergent fields like those of the natural and behavioral sciences, and. In Part III we will take a different approach and primarily study different defenses, critiques, and reconstructions of the concept. Chapters 5 engages thinkers and schools of thought that sometimes reject the value of the concept itself, as well as those that criticize specific conceptions of objectivity but that still accept (...) the value of the concept of objectivity. Chapter 5 looks mostly at feminist and social epistemology. Some feminist and social epistemologists we will engage in this chapter believe that a critique of the prevailing notion of objectivity and development of a new and more satisfactory understanding of objectivity actually ‘runs to the heart’ of their own research. (shrink)

This study aims to develop a valid and reliable scale to assess whether a physician is inclined to take conscientious objection when asked to perform medical services that clash with his/her personal beliefs. The scale, named the Inclination toward Conscientious Objection Scale, was developed for physicians in Turkey. Face validity, content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity of the scale were evaluated in the development process. While measuring criterion-related validity, Student’s t-test was used to identify the groups that did and (...) did not show inclination toward conscientious objection. There were 126 items in the initial item pool, which reduced to 42 after content validity evaluation by five experts. After necessary adjustments, the scale was administered to 224 participants. Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed to investigate factor structure. The split-half method was employed to assess scale reliability, and the Spearman-Brown coefficient was calculated. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient was used to estimate the internal consistency of the scale items. The distinctiveness of the items was evaluated using Student’s t-test. The lower and upper 27% groups were compared to assess the distinctiveness of the scale. The items were loaded on four factors that explained 85.46% of the variance: “Conscientious Objection – Medical Profession Relationship,” “Conscientious Objection in Medical Education and Medical Practice,” “Conscientious Objection with regard to the Concept of Rights” and “Conscientious Objection – Physician’s Professional Identity and Role.” The final scale has 40 items, and was found to be valid and reliable with high internal consistency. (shrink)

The concept of disease remains hotly contested. In light of problems with existing accounts, some theorists argue that the disease concept ought to be eliminated. We answer this skeptical challenge by reframing the discussion in terms of the role that the disease concept plays in the complex network of health-care institutions in which it is deployed. We argue that while prevailing accounts do not suffer from the particular defects that critics have identified, they do suffer from other deficits, and this (...) leads us to propose a new account that satisfies the desiderata for a concept of disease in human medicine. (shrink)

Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression ‘knows’ depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that ‘knows’ is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the ‘disagreement problem’, which concerns the behaviour of ‘knows’ in (...) disagreement reports. These may not be the only objections to epistemic contextualism, but they are probably the most influential. I argue that the best current epistemic contextualist response to the linguistic objection is incomplete, and I show how it can be supplemented to deal with the full range of linguistic objections. I also develop a new solution to the disagreement problem. The upshot is that neither sort of objection gives us any reason to reject epistemic contextualism. This conclusion is, in a sense, negative—no new arguments for epistemic contextualism are advanced—but it’s a vital step towards rehabilitating the view. (shrink)

This article defends a pragmatic conception of objectivity for the moral domain. I begin by contextualizing pragmatic approaches to objectivity and discuss at some length one of the most interesting proposals in this area, Cheryl Misak's conception of pragmatic objectivity. My general argument is that in order to defend a pragmatic approach to objectivity, the pragmatic stance should be interpreted in more radical terms than most contemporary proposals do. I suggest in particular that we should disentangle (...) objectivity from truth, and I claim that moral inquiry is in most cases responsive to a normative standard that is closer to warranted assertibility than to truth. Using an argument that relies partly on Huw Price's account of forms of normative assertion, I will show that a practice-based account of warranted assertibility does the epistemic work required to defend objectivity while avoiding exposure to the criticisms that are usually addressed against this notion. (shrink)

Stroke is a severe health issue, and motor recovery after stroke remains an important challenge in the rehabilitation field. Neurofeedback, as part of a brain–computer interface, is a technique for modulating brain activity using on-line feedback that has proved to be useful in motor rehabilitation for the chronic stroke population in addition to traditional therapies. Nevertheless, its use and applications in the field still leave unresolved questions. The brain pathophysiological mechanisms after stroke remain partly unknown, and the possibilities for intervention (...) on these mechanisms to promote cerebral plasticity are limited in clinical practice. In NFB motor rehabilitation, the aim is to adapt the therapy to the patient’s clinical context using brain imaging, considering the time after stroke, the localization of brain lesions, and their clinical impact, while taking into account currently used biomarkers and technical limitations. These modern techniques also allow a better understanding of the physiopathology and neuroplasticity of the brain after stroke. We conducted a narrative literature review of studies using NFB for post-stroke motor rehabilitation. The main goal was to decompose all the elements that can be modified in NFB therapies, which can lead to their adaptation according to the patient’s context and according to the current technological limits. Adaptation and individualization of care could derive from this analysis to better meet the patients’ needs. We focused on and highlighted the various clinical and technological components considering the most recent experiments. The second goal was to propose general recommendations and enhance the limits and perspectives to improve our general knowledge in the field and allow clinical applications. We highlighted the multidisciplinary approach of this work by combining engineering abilities and medical experience. Engineering development is essential for the available technological tools and aims to increase neuroscience knowledge in the NFB topic. This technological development was born out of the real clinical need to provide complementary therapeutic solutions to a public health problem, considering the actual clinical context of the post-stroke patient and the practical limits resulting from it. (shrink)

I contend that mathematical domains are freestanding institutional entities that, at least typically, are introduced to serve representational functions. In this paper, I outline an account of institutional reality and a supporting metaontological perspective that clarify the content of this thesis. I also argue that a philosophy of mathematics that has this thesis as its central tenet can account for the objectivity, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics.

This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional (...) attitudes that captures both empty and non-empty cases by properly locating the posited representations in the metaphysical structure of the attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a new way to understand the integration of facts and values in the concept of mental disorder that has the potential to avoid the flaws of previous hybrid approaches. I import conceptual tools from the account of procedural objectivity defended by Helen Longino to resolve the controversy over the definition of mental disorder. My argument is threefold: I first sketch the history of the debate opposing objectivists and constructivists and focus on the criticisms (...) that led to the emergence of the debate. Second, I offer a reconstruction of the “Natural Function Approach” argument to make explicit an unsound assumption underlying this approach. The reconstruction will allow me to show that the NFO’s argument depends on the ideal of value-free science that I will criticize. Then I propose an alternative ideal for psychiatry: social objectivity. I argue that the concept of mental health should be seen as “socially objective” rather than value-free, moving the debate towards the social procedures by which the definition is produced rather than the normative and factual content of its definition. (shrink)

Traditional accounts stress certain features of theoretical objects such as their alleged imperceptibility, that are taken to raise epistemological difficulties. But these accounts do not show how theoretical objects, rightly understood, either differ in kind from more ordinary sorts of objects or make science possible. I sketch a new account that focuses on the underdetermination and similarity of theoretical objects, features closely connected to the explanatory roles they play, and construes them on an algebraic model.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Filosofia ellenistica e cultura moderna: Epicureismo, stoicismo e scetticismo da Bayle a Hegel by Giovanni BonacinaJosé R. Maia NetoGiovanni Bonacina. Filosofia ellenistica e cultura moderna: Epicureismo, stoicismo e scetticismo da Bayle a Hegel. Firenze: Casa Editrice Le Lettere, 1996. Pp. 358. Paper, L 52,000.The Hellenistic schools played a major role in the rise of modern philosophy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Stoicism was influential in the development (...) of a secular ethics emancipated from theology, Epicureanism in the mechanical and corpuscular views of the new science, and Skepticism in the predominant role that epistemology assumed in modern philosophy. Bonacina shows that this influence continued to be considerable during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He examines the treatment of these three Hellenistic philosophies by a large number of (mostly German) historians of philosophy and by the main philosophers of the period. Among the historians, Bonacina detects a progressive drive towards historical objectivity. However, the religious interest in the assessment of the ancient schools is still noticeable until the early eighteenth century when it begins to be increasingly replaced by contemporary philosophical sympathies and affiliations. This interest is even stronger among the main philosophers of the period, who use the Hellenistic philosophies as weapons in the intellectual battles in which they were engaged. A brief summary of the main aspects of this use, first of Stoicism and Epicureanism, and then of Skepticism, by some of the major philosophers examined by Bonacina will illustrate this central point of the book.Bayle continues Gassendi’s project of rehabilitating Epicurus. But his effort is not to make Epicureanism compatible with Christianity. He uses Epicurus’ philosophy to enhance his opposition to rational theology and Epicurus’ alleged virtuous life to corroborate his view that forced conversions cannot be justified by the need to make atheists or heretics good citizens. According to Bayle, Stoics—unlike Skeptics and Epicureans and like Catholic monks—are intolerant dogmatists, holding views incompatible with the true religion. A few years later, in the context of the French Enlightenment, the assessment of Stoicism and Epicureanism is still determined by antireligious controversy, but now revelation itself becomes the main target. Diderot, d’Holbach and La Mettrie all hold that a Stoic ethics which despises the passions is incompatible with human nature (just like Christian morals and contrary to Epicurean morals). Voltaire’s evaluation of Stoicism and Epicureanism strikes both his contemporary materialists and Christianity. Stoic deism is for Voltaire the alternative both to materialism and to revealed religion. Bonacina also shows that the Stoic/Epicurean opposition in ethics is an important weapon among the British moralists. While Shaftesbury finds in Stoicism [End Page 324] support for his view of innate moral feelings, Mandeville opposes him, attacking Stoicism and defending Epicureanism. Moving to the German context, Bonacina shows that Kant is often sympathetic towards Epicurus, in particular when the ancient philosopher is contrasted with modern ones. Epicurus’s materialism may have had only a phenomenal status and is more internally consistent than a modern materialism such as Locke’s, who accepts the existence of a nonmaterial God and soul. As to Stoic ethics, Kant claims that it is partially true—to the extent that virtue is not conditioned—and partially false, for the Stoics think of the summum bonum as empirically available whereas it is an ideal of practical reason. Hegel also uses Stoicism and Epicureanism for the vindication of his own philosophy and criticism of established ones. For instance, Stoic ethics is a step in the development of the Mind, but just like Kantian ethics it is empty, deprived of ethicity and therefore in need of being dialectically overcome.Skepticism plays perhaps an even larger role in the philosophical debates of the period. Bayle takes the Skeptic standpoint (in opposition to the dogmatist in general and to the Stoic in particular) as the model for the historian of ideas who must objectively report the views and critically examine them without religious and philosophical preconceptions. Even more than Epicurus, Pyrrho is presented as a foe of rational theology and as indirectly showing the need of appealing to pure faith. Bonacina then examines the role played by Skepticism in the... (shrink)

Because the visual system cannot process all of the objects, colors, and features present in a visual scene, visual attention allows some visual stimuli to be selected and processed over others. Most research on visual attention has focused on spatial or location-based attention, in which the locations occupied by stimuli are selected for further processing. Recent research, however, has demonstrated the importance of objects in organizing (or segregating) visual scenes and guiding attentional selection. Because of the long history of spatial (...) attention research, theories of spatial attention are more mature than theories of other visual processes, such as object segregation and object attention. In the present paper, I outline a biased competition account of object segregation and attention, following similar accounts that have been developed for spatial attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). In my biased competition account, I seek to understand how some objects can be segregated and selected over other objects in a complex visual scene. Under this account, there are two sources of visual information that allow an object to be processed over other objects: bottom-up information carried by the physical stimulus and top-down information based on an observer's goals. I use the biased competition account to combine many diverse findings from the object segregation and attention literatures into a common framework. (shrink)

The tremendous advances of research into artificial intelligence as well as neuroscience made over the last two to three decades have given further support to a renewed interest into philosophical discussions of the mind-body problem. Especially the last decade has seen a revival of panpsychist and idealist considerations, often focused on solving philosophical puzzles like the socalled hard problem of consciousness.1–9 While a number of respectable philosophers advocate some sort of panpsychistic solution to the mind-body problem now, fewer advocate that (...) idealism can contribute substantially to the debate. Interest in idealism has nevertheless risen again, as can be seen also from recent overview articles and collections of works.10–14 The working hypothesis here is that a properly formulated idealism can not only provide an alternative view of the mind/matter gap, but that this new view will also shed light on open questions in our common scientific, i.e. materialist, world view. To investigate this possibility, idealism first of all needs a model for the integration of modern science which allows for a mathematically consistent reinterpretation of the physical world as a limiting case of a both material and non-material world, which would make the outcome of idealistic considerations accessible to scientific investigation. To develop such a model I will first try to explain what I mean when I speak of a ‘scientifically tenable’ idealism, including a formulation of the emanation problem which for idealism replaces the interaction problem, then give a very brief summary of the available elements of such a theory in the philosophical literature, before sketching out some ‘design questions’ which have to be answered upon the construction of such models, and finally put forward a first model for a scientifically tenable objective idealism. (shrink)

The Association of Staff Developers in Philosophy for Children came into being in 1988. It was the result of staff developers feelin a need to be a part of an ongoing community of inquiry among themselves concerning problems of staff development, drawing upon our collective experience as staff developers, and recognizing our autonomy as philosophers. At the San Antonio Symposium in April of 1989, an Excutivr Board of 5 persons was elected: Marie Hungerman, Gerard Potvin, Cynthia Duque, Ron Reed, Ann (...) Sharp, and myself, Dale Cannon, as President, One of our decisions at that meeting was to solicit reports from different Centers of Philosophy for Children on their experience with different formats of staff developement and publish them in Analytic Teaching. The longer range goal was inclusion in a projected resource manual for staff development. (shrink)

This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue (...) for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the past—namely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a file’s being a device for singular thought—that it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it contains—can be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects. (shrink)